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Draft 10/7/16 
Accounting for Prosecutors    
by Daniel C. Richman*   
What role should prosecutors play in promoting citizenship within a liberal democracy?  
And how can a liberal democracy hold its prosecutors accountable for playing that role? 
Holding others – not just citizens but other institutions – to account is at the core of what 
prosecutors do.  As gatekeepers to the adjudicatory process, prosecutors shape what 
charges are brought and against whom, and will (if allowed to) become shapers of 
citizenship. They can also promote police compliance with legal and democratic norms. 
Because the prosecutorial role in case creation is largest when crimes are not open and 
notorious, prosecutors can moreover play an outsized role in the bringing of cases that 
target instances of illegitimate subordination (including domestic violence) and 
corruption that are antithetical to a liberal democracy.   
After considering ways in which prosecutors might promote democratic values, I explore 
how prosecutors can be held to account.  Working from existing practices and structures, 
I consider how to promote their contributions through legal and institutional design with 
respect to reason-giving obligations, geographic scale, insulation from direct political 
influence, and modulation of their message. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
What role should prosecutors play in promoting citizenship within a liberal democracy?  
And how can a liberal democracy hold its prosecutors accountable for playing that role? 
While these fundamental questions, regularly posed of the police,1 are asked all too rarely 
of prosecutors, answering them requires a lot of framing and bracketing. 
Particularly when thinking about prosecutors, we ought not assume that manifestly 
democratic processes – say, elections – are the best institutional design for promoting 
liberal democratic values.  Following the policing literature,2 let us start with those basic 
                                                
* Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Alexandra Bowie, Shawn Boyne, 
Devon Carbado, Beth Colgan, Angela Davis, Sharon Dolovich, Antony Duff, Michael Farbiarz, Robert 
Ferguson, Michael Graetz, Remy Grosbard, Kevin Grossinger, Jackie Hodgson, Olati Johnson, David 
Kessler, Maximo Langer, Adriaan Lanni, Jen Laurin, Jerry Lynch, Ed Rubin, Sarah Seo, Ian Shapiro, 
William Simon, David Sklansky, Eric Talley, Sherrod Thaxton, Loic Waquant, and attendees at the 2016 
UCLA Prosecutors and Democracy Workshop, and a Columbia Law School workshop. 
1 See Diarmaid Harkin, Simmel, The Police Form and the Limits of Democratic Policing, 55 Brit. J. 
Criminol. 730–46 (2015); see also Andy Aitchison, Jarrett Blaustein, Policing for Democracy or 
Democratically Responsive Policing? Examining the Limits of Externally Driven Police Reform,10 Eur. J. 
Criminol., 496 (2013). 
2 See Trevor Jones, Tim Newburn, & David J. Smith, Policing and the Idea of Democracy, 36 Brit. J. 
Criminol. 182 (1996); see also Peter K. Manning, Democratic Policing in a Changing World, 7 (2010) 
(suggesting that idea that police should be “part of producing a democratic state” “is getting the entire 
argument backward.  It is a democratic state and culture that produce democratic policing and, and there is 
no evidence that the contrary can result.”). 
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values – political representativeness, a commitment to anti-subordination or (as Ian 
Shapiro calls it) non-domination,3 and due process of law – and then consider how 
prosecutors can promote them.  
But first comes the challenge of avoiding parochialism when identifying what 
prosecutors do.  Are they freewheeling political actors exercising judicially unreviewable 
discretion?  Subordinated functionaries exercising highly scrutinized professional 
judgment?  Prosecutors play extraordinarily varied roles across liberal democracies, 
linked only by some shared duty to assess the fitness of criminal cases for adjudication 
and to shepherd fit cases through the process.  Anne van Aaken usefully sets out the basic 
role of a “procuracy”:  
(i) it has the competence to gather information on the behavior of criminal 
suspects, or to instruct the police to gather more information; (ii) on the basis of 
that information it has the competence to indict a suspect; (iii) during a trial it 
represents the interests of the public.4   
These officials are variously housed in the executive, the judiciary, or a distinct branch of 
government,5 but functionally they occupy the space between “police” and “courts.”   
This intermediary role provides a methodological point of departure.  Others have 
focused on the police when exploring how democratic criminal justice institutions must 
“balance the goals of coercion and responsiveness,” protecting the citizenry while “still 
maintaining the core conditions of democracy.”6  To the extent that policing relies on the 
promise or threat of criminal adjudications, the work on democratic policing by David 
Bayley, David Sklansky, Peter Manning7 and others offers a valuable starting point for 
thinking about prosecutors.  My goal here is thus to peel off the distinctive contributions 
of prosecutors, distinguishing those from their subsidiary duties. 
I will begin, in Part II, by considering the role prosecutors can play in constructing and 
sustaining democratic citizenship.  This is a story about account giving and account 
demanding. Not only do prosecutors present narratives of criminality but they are also 
uniquely positioned to hold those who exercise illegitimate power to account and to 
promote the accountability of other actors in the criminal justice system.  
                                                
3 Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice (1999); see also Ian Shapiro, The Real World of Democratic Theory 
(2011). 
4Anne van Aaken, et al., Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? An Empirical Evaluation 
Across Seventy-Eight Countries, 12 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 204, 265 (2010). 
5 Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 Crime and Justice, 1–33 (2012). 
6Amy Lerman and Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American 
Crime Control, 61 (2014) [hereinafter Lerman & Weaver, Arresting Citizenship].   
7 David H. Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad (2005); David Alan 
Sklansky, Democracy and the Police (2008) [hereinafter Sklansky, Democracy and the Police]; Manning, 
supra note 2. 
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This vision of prosecutorial contributions comes with an expository bias, because it risks 
normalizing the outsized role played by prosecutors in the United States.  One can 
counteract the bias by remembering to ask whether other state actors are better equipped, 
institutionally or as a matter of democratic legitimacy, to perform those functions.  Yet, 
for better or worse (and especially because I would have it anyway), an American bias 
makes sense here. 
To be sure, the American prosecutorial “establishment” has been the subject of extensive, 
and frequently well-grounded, criticism.  Many, most notably Bill Stuntz,8 have written 
about the “pathological politics” that drive the legislative authority that U.S. prosecutors 
wield.  Most outsiders (and many insiders) find the American reliance on elected or 
politically connected prosecutors odd, even ridiculous – a fact that itself highlights the 
varied and contestable “modes” of public accountability in this area.9  Overshadowing all 
is also the extraordinary U.S. incarceration rate, which John Pfaff has convincingly 
shown to be driven, at least at the margins, by prosecutorial decision making.10  
Yet while no one is keen to admit borrowing anything from the United States in this area, 
the American model of the prosecutor as the effective and discretion-exercising 
gatekeeper of criminal adjudications seems to be spreading internationally.11  So too is 
interest in pursuing the kinds of crimes – ranging from domestic violence to political 
corruption – that, as will be seen, the police cannot easily pursue without prosecutorial 
assistance that pushes beyond more limited notions of the prosecutorial role.   
A final justification for normalizing a maximal conception of the prosecutorial role – at 
least as a conversational starting point – rests on my interest in institutional alternatives: 
To the extent that other regimes neither assign nor license prosecutors to play a role they 
actually or potentially play in the United States, it would be analytically useful to hear 
who, if anyone, plays it and the rationales for that assignment.   
Part III turns to how a democracy that relies on prosecutors to hold others accountable 
can ensure that prosecutors are themselves held to account.  The accountability of 
prosecutors in a democracy certainly need not be achieved through direct elections.  
Indeed, one might argue that only prosecutors highly insulated from direct political 
responsibility can really promote democratic values.  Still, notwithstanding Ed Rubin’s 
                                                
8 See William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (2011); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505 (2001). 
9 See Michael W. Dowdle, Public Accountability: Conceptual, Historical, and Epistemic Mappings, 1, 14, 
in Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) [hereinafter 
Dowdle, Public Accountability].  
10 John Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 Ga. St. Univ. L. Rev. 1 (2012). 
11 See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1413, 1531 (2010); 
see also Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea 
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (2004). 
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Occam-like analysis of what “accountability” entails,12 the breadth of my normative 
vision of what prosecutors should do keeps me from simply valorizing fine-grained 
bureaucratic control (of the sort one finds in France, Germany, and Japan – to name just 
three paradigmatic cases).   
So then, how can I specify the optimal regime of prosecutorial accountability?  I can’t 
and don’t want to.  Once one recognizes the value trade-offs that must inevitably be made 
across institutional designs, optimality becomes elusive.  A large part of the problem is 
that those features well suited to advancing one project won’t be so well suited for 
advancing another.  Jerry Mashaw credits Gunther Teubner with identifying the 
fundamental “regulatory trilemma”: “We demand that regulatory institutions be 
simultaneously coherent (the rule of law or regularity norm), effective (a variant of the 
efficiency norm), and responsive (open to the influence of social demands and cultural 
understandings.”  Yet “virtually any attempt to reinforce one of these demands works to 
limit the capacity of the regulatory institution to satisfy another.”13  This dilemma looms 
large when one thinks about prosecutors.  But accountability remains critical.  After 
noting the limitations of specific accountability paradigms, Part III turns to cross-cutting 
institutional design and legal regime considerations that might, when balanced, foster the 
legitimacy without which prosecutors can’t, and shouldn’t be allowed to, do their jobs.   
II. CONSTRUCTING AND SUSTAINING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 
 
Before considering how prosecutors can shape society, one ought to first nail down the 
role of criminal law – the principal instrument of prosecutorial action – in a liberal 
democracy.  Permit me to bracket this critical question, however, not just because of 
limited space but in deference to Ricardo’s Law of Comparative Advantage: I’d much 
prefer to stand on the shoulders of Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, and others who have 
done exceptional work on it.14  For now, I assume that the penal statutes prosecutors 
enforce are within the range of possibilities in a tolerably well-functioning liberal 
democracy.   
The focus here is, first, on the peculiar role of prosecutors in account telling and account 
holding: how they set the terms of effective criminalization and build narratives of 
criminality.  Thereafter, I turn to how, in playing that role, they obtain a privileged 
                                                
12 Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 52, 
in Dowdle, Public Accountability, supra note 9. 
13 Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of 
Governance, 115, 154, in Dowdle, Public Accountability, supra note 9.  
14 Antony Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship and Criminal Law, 125-50, in Philosophical Foundations of 
Criminal Law (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green, eds. 2011) [hereinafter Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship and 
Criminal Law]; Antony Duff, Discretion and Accountability in a Democratic Criminal Law (in this 
volume); Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (2016); see 
also Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 307 (2004); 
Tommie Shelby, Punishment, Condemnation, and Social Injustice (unpublished draft) (discussing 
justifiable enforcement in an unjust society). 
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vantage point within the criminal law enforcement system that allows them to make 
demands upon other institutions to promote the collective account-holding project. 
A. Constructing Effective Narratives of Criminality 
 
In their distinct role as the translators of general penal provisions into particularized 
criminal charges, prosecutors both turn law into action and narrate the circumstances 
under which they hold defendants to account.  Whether or not prosecutors see themselves 
as constructing democratic citizenship when doing so, that is a foreseeable result of their 
actions. 
1. Turning Generalized Penal Laws into Action Within the Courtroom 
 
The mere passage of penal legislation can have a transformative expressive effect.15  
Moreover, one has only to look at cities where minor drug offenses, though not 
necessarily charged in court, structure the rationales for police activity on the street,16 to 
see how criminal law can actively shape citizenship (i.e. who gets stopped and who 
worries that he’ll be stopped) without adjudication. Yet whether because actual 
enforcement gives meaning to what otherwise would be empty legislative posturing, 
because the police eventually lose authority when the people they arrest never get 
charged, or simply because the formal characterization of a specific act or person as 
“criminal” is highly consequential, prosecutors – as adjudicative gatekeepers – 
potentially play an outsized role in translating criminal “law on the books” to criminal 
“law in action.” 
 
Given the absence of any stable transnational definitions of precisely who the police are 
and what they do, I suppose a prosecutor could play a perfectly serviceable role within a 
liberal democracy without adding more value to case-processing than a notary adds to a 
real estate transaction.  All the action could be within the police, with the prosecutor 
simply filing formal charges selected and prepared by others.  But the virtually universal 
reliance on lawyers to perform this gatekeeping function (at least for serious offenses) 
highlights the non-ministerial role prosecutors are expected to play in performing the 
translation function: As the link between the police and the adjudicative process, 
prosecutors are responsible for ensuring that a defendant gets the legal process that the 
law has deemed his “due” and that liberal democracies value at their core.17  By 
proceeding against a defendant only where the evidence supports a charge and where 
other legal prerequisites have been met, prosecutors help ensure that the criminal law in 
                                                
15 See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349 (1997). 
16 See Amanda Geller, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race and the New Disorder in New York City Street 
Policing, 7 J. Emp. Legal Stud. 591 (2010). 
17 See Archon Fung, Practical Reasoning About Institutions: Governance Innovations in the Development 
of Democratic Theories, 2-4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript); see also Hung-En Sung, Democracy and 
Criminal Justice in Cross-National Perspective: From Crime Control to Due Process, 605 Annals, Am. 
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 311, 315 (May 2006). 
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action is faithful to the substance of legislated penal statutes and to the values underlying 
the larger criminal law project.   
Such is the purely “professional” component of the prosecutorial contribution to the 
democratic order – “professional” in the narrow sense of law experts drawing on their 
training and experience to stitch together facts and determine whether they fit the 
definition of a crime.18  Beyond that is a distinctively “political” component – “political” 
not necessarily in the sweeping sense of “policy-making” but in the more limited sense of 
playing an assigned role in a polity over and above the one a “mere” lawyer might play. 
The extent and nature of that political contribution varies across systems but inevitably 
entails a modulation of the penal sanctions that the legislature ostensibly mandated for 
provable conduct.  For now, I will be open as to the nature, formality or legitimacy of this 
modulation.  Broad notions of “prosecutorial discretion” over what charges they need 
bring and against whom allow American prosecutors to effectively “define” criminal law 
to be well short of that ostensibly set by statute.19  Conversely, through the cases they 
take and the way they frame the facts, American prosecutors regularly push the law 
beyond its initially assumed limits.20  Elsewhere, to various degrees, one finds 
recognition of prosecutors’ de jure or de facto ability to moderate the severity of penal 
consequences in the interests of efficiency, justice, or some combination of the two.  
Even where the “principle of legality” – as opposed to those of “opportunity” or 
“expediency” – is unmuted, distinctions in the zeal with which evidence is gathered and 
investigatory and adjudicative resources committed will exist (whether recognized or 
disregarded). 
Whether authorized to or not,21 prosecutors will inevitably shape the application of 
criminal law to the polities they serve and – to varying extents across regimes – write 
their enforcement agendas into the dockets they manage.  They also may (or should) take 
a peculiar ownership in the punitive outcomes of their work.  The police who apprehend a 
suspect surely have views on whether and how much he should be punished – views that 
prosecutors are bound to take into account.22  I suspect, however, that, absent some 
                                                
18 Hung-En Sung, supra note 17, at 315 (“A commitment to professionalism and respect for expertise 
provide the foundation for an increased insulation of criminal justice operations from political interferences 
and populist demands.”).  
19 See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117 (1998) 
[hereinafter Lynch, Our Administrative System]; Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The 
Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 
223 (2006). 
20 See Daniel C. Richman, Kate Stith, & William J. Stuntz, Defining Federal Crimes (2014). 
21See Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice Systems 
Uncommonly at Odds, Part 2, 18 Tulane J. Int’l & Comp. Law 335, 353 (2010) (noting that in Australia, 
concerns about “horse trading” in plea bargaining have spurred concerns that offenders “are not receiving 
their ‘just deserts.’”). 
22 See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 
749 (2003). 
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immediate public safety issue, prosecutors, being far more involved in adjudication, take 
a greater interest in the quantity of punishment than cops, since granular issues of 
individual desert are more likely to have been developed in conjunction with judicial 
processes that follow arrest.  Prosecutors’ institutional proximity to the judicial process 
may also come with a special capacity to spearhead diversionary programs that reduce 
the punitive effects of police enforcement practices.23   
The mediating effect played by prosecutors can have a social valence beyond advancing 
enforcement preferences and modulating punishment.  To the extent there is any play in 
the adjudicative joints, they will also be able to exacerbate or mitigate the influence of 
racial, social, or political inequality on criminal justice outcomes.  The nature of this 
capability will vary, as legal or institutional factors promote or undermine “blind justice.”  
Particularly in adversarial systems (and again my U.S. bias shows here), the quality of 
publicly provided defense counsel24 may have determinative, cascading effects on 
adjudicative outcomes.  More generally, whether prosecutors take ownership of the 
adjudicative process or are simply critical contributors to it, their work will have 
distributional effects that they can either consider or ignore.   Indeed, because 
disadvantaged groups may simultaneously be both over- and under-policed, I use the 
term “modulate,” rather than “moderate,” as intervention can lead across cases to both 
more and less punitive outcomes.25 
My use of “modulate” also reflects the dependency of prosecutorial activity on the work 
of other criminal justice components, especially the police and the courts.  Perhaps one 
reason the scholarly literature has paid more attention to “democratic policing” than 
“democratic prosecuting” is that a lot of what prosecutors do is interstitial, dampening the 
zeal of some (units or individuals) and spurring others on.   
2. Presenting Authoritative Accounts of Criminality  
 
To maintain a transnational focus, I will not say much about how prosecutors can affect 
the imposition of punishment on those they bring into the adjudicative process.  In the 
United States of course – particularly where prosecutors have discretion over whether to 
bring charges with mandatory sentencing terms – their ability to shape criminal justice 
outcomes is at a zenith.26  Even when prosecutors lack that formal power and when 
                                                
23 Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 165, 181 (2013) (noting that 
“American diversion programs, like treatment courts, have largely relied on the decision-making of non-
police actors further down the criminal processing timeline – especially prosecutors,” but arguing for more 
police initiatives in this direction); see also Bronwyn Naylor & Adam Fletcher, A Justice Reinvestment 
Approach to Criminal Justice in Australia (March 2013). 
24 A quality that itself may depend on prosecutorial political advocacy, see infra text accompanying notes 
121–122. 
25 That such modulating efforts can come from police investigators as well is illustrated by the powerful 
story of a few Los Angeles homicide detectives committed to making “black lives matter.” Jill Loevy, 
Ghettoside (2015).  And I wouldn’t be surprised to read similar accounts of dogged cops elsewhere. 
26 See William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in 
Criminal Procedure Stories (Carol Steiker, ed. 2003); Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The 
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judges have sentencing discretion, prosecutors’ control over the information that flows to 
judges and the extent to which judges defer to them can have a similar effect.27  Suffice it 
to say that prosecutors who can control or substantially affect adjudicative outcomes will 
have a far greater influence on criminal law in action than those who are primarily 
gatekeepers. 
Even when they act as “mere” gatekeepers, however, one ought not minimize how 
prosecutors shape democratic citizenship.  Gatekeeping entails not merely the decision 
about putting criminal defendant “in jeopardy” and to what extent; it is also a pivotal part 
of the process wherein the state authoritatively announces who is, after due process, to be 
treated as a “criminal.”  Indeed, it is through this condemnation that, as Emile Durkheim 
and others have pushed us to realize, a society defines itself.28 
Moreover, prosecutors do not silently preside over gates, for the essence of their job is to 
explain how the law has been violated.  As Jerry Mashaw has noted, inherent in the 
adjudication process is not just the application of norms but the creation of them.29  In 
addition to holding people accountable in the “modulated” process already described, 
prosecutors model accountability through the narrative that the law requires them to tell.  
Indeed, the very mechanism for holding defendants to account requires the presentation 
of a narrative (an account) that helps construct the socio-legal environment.    
To be sure, in numbers and ubiquity, the police surely loom larger than prosecutors as 
civic educators.  As Ian Loader writes: “The police send authoritative signals to citizens 
about the kind of political community of which they are members, the manner in which 
that community is governed, and the place they occupy in its extant hierarchies.”30  Yet 
we cannot ignore the way the adjudicative process – and not just its outcomes – teaches 
citizens about “the political world they inhabit.”31  It is not just the announcement of the 
charges – to which political and institutional status of the prosecutor might lend special 
resonance and volume – but the manner in which the charges are proved: the evidence 
presented and the inferences urged. 
                                                                                                                                            
Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 
223 (2006).  
27 See José Cabranes & Kate Stith, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts (1998).    
28 See Frederic Megret, Practices of Stigmatization, 76 J. Law & Contemp. Probs. 287 (2013); Emile 
Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society, 40-43 (W.D. Halls, trans. 1984). 
29 Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of 
Governance, 115, 130, in Dowdle, Public Accountability, supra note 9. 
30 See Ian Loader, In Search of Civic Policing: Recasting the “Peelian” Principles, Crim. Law & Philos. at 2 
(2014); see also Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, supra note 7. 
31 Lerman & Weaver, Arresting Citizenship, supra note 6, at 10; see also id. at 111 (suggesting that 
“criminal justice contact rivals other more traditional politically socializing experiences and venues for 
civic education,” and that “this socialization, unlike other interactions with the government, cleaves 
custodial citizens from the broader democratic polity”). 
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Malcolm Thorburn has highlighted how, in contrast to criminal law theorists like H.L.A. 
Hart, for whom “the point of the criminal trial is simply to determine whether or not the 
accused deserves to be punished,” Antony Duff has put the trial center stage.  For Duff, 
“[t]he criminal trial is a place where members of a political community come together to 
engage in discussion about moral wrongdoing.”32  In a trial-driven world, Duff’s dialogic 
account is thus particularly useful for distinguishing the distinctive contribution of 
prosecutors from that of the criminal law project more generally.  
Yes, I realize that in some countries (like mine), trials are rare.  The truncated 
adjudication characteristic of plea bargaining often renders the authoritative information 
ostensibly promised by criminal proceedings thin and formulaic – sometimes with only a 
passing relationship to historical fact.  A world without trials is thus one without much 
moral dialogue about wrongdoing.  Of course in theory, the judge presiding over the plea 
allocutions and sentencings that replace trials could still ensure a “communicative 
interaction between the accused and his accusers.”33  Indeed, in Germany, where plea 
agreements are becoming more prevalent,34 the Federal Constitutional Court recently 
demanded that judges push far beyond a defendant’s plea-bargained based confession in 
order to determine his true culpability.35  At least in the United States though, the churn 
of business in busy courtrooms will likely turn the dialogues that Duff celebrates into 
generic scripts.36 
Still, when there are trials or sustained judicial inquiries, the condemnation sought by 
prosecutors and the manner in which they seek it will probably have a texture and nuance 
that provide an instrument for social definition going beyond the “criminal” label.  
Whether conducted in an accusatory system or an inquisitorial system (but more so in the 
former), trials have a performative and narrative aspect.37  Particularly in an adversarial 
system, the prosecution’s “case” ends up being a story it tells – a story that may draw on 
                                                
32 Malcolm Thorburn, Calling Antony Duff to Account, 9 Crim. L. & Philos. 737, 744 (2015); see also 
Duff in this volume.  Compare H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968). 
33 Thorburn, supra note 32, at 744. 
34 Regina E. Rauxloh, Formalization of Plea Bargaining in Germany: Will the New Legislation Be Able to 
Square the Circle, 34 Fordham Int’l L. J. 296, 297 (2011). 
35 Alexander Schemmel, Christian Corell & Natalie Richter, Plea Bargaining in Criminal Proceedings: 
Changes to Criminal Defense Counsel Practice as a Result of the German Constitutional Court Verdict of 
19 March 2013?, 15 German L.J. 43 (2014). 
36 Kimberley Brownlee, The Offender’s Part in the Dialogue, in Crime, Punishment, & Responsibility: 
Festschrift for Antony Duff, 54 (R. Cruft, M. Kramer & M. Reiff, eds. 2011). 
37 See Greta Olson, Narration and Narrative in Legal Discourse, sec. 2, in The Living Handbook of 
Narratology (Peter Hühn, ed. May 2014) (“‘Narration’ in legal discourse most commonly denotes the 
contest of stories that transpires in adversarial or, with different actors, in inquisitorial trials.”); see also 
Robert P. Burns, A Theory of the Trial (1999); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trials, 101 Geo. 
L.J. 281 (2013).   
 10 
existing narrative tropes, but that inevitably reinforces, legitimates, and extends them.38  
What gets left out can matter as much as what is filled in, as happens, for example, when 
a prosecutor, for ease of proof or because the extra sentencing exposure seems 
unnecessary, leaves out the bias aspect of what “ought” to be understood as a hate 
crime.39 
Perhaps the prosecutor will construct a narrative not just of the “crime” but of the 
defendant.  In common law countries, a prosecutor’s move in that direction will in be 
tension with liberal criminal law’s limited interest in delving the depths of personal 
culpability40 and with rules of evidence designed to restrict fact-finder attention to the 
charged offense.  At sentencing, however, broader inquiries may take center stage, and 
whether a prosecutor pitches the defendant as a citizen who erred or a miscreant who 
needs to be put away can (depending on the sentencing scheme) make all the difference. 
Through trials, prosecutors can teach jurors, witnesses, and other lay (or official) 
participants about the fairness, or lack thereof, of the criminal justice process.  Indeed, 
education through jury service is an oft-cited goal in Japan’s recent (albeit limited) move 
toward the use of juries in the most serious criminal cases.  There, the idea was “to 
incorporate sound common sense into the deliberative process, increase public 
understanding of Japan's judicial system, promote civic responsibility, and enhance the 
tools of democracy available to the citizenry.”41  Those attending (or merely attending to) 
the trial can also learn more case-specific “truths” about how the world works, lessons – 
about, say, who “really” is a victim and who “deserves” punishment.42  The extent to 
which prosecutors drive this “educational” process varies across systems, as does whether 
it amounts to a real education or dangerous self-corroboration.  Regardless, over time 
(and perhaps with media help) such stories will take a life of their own and shape social 
norms.43 
                                                
38 Defense narratives can have similar effects. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 
6 (1994) (“The battered woman syndrome defense rests on and reaffirms [an] invidious understanding of 
women's incapacity for rational self-control.”). 
39 Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 858, 889 (2014). 
40 See Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Rethinking Criminal Responsibility for Poor Offenders: Choice, Monstrosity, 
and the Logic of Practice, 55 McGill L. J. 771 (2010). 
41 Matthew J. Wilson, Japan’s New Criminal Jury System: In Need of More Transparency, More Access, 
and More Time, 33 Ford. Int’l L. J. 487, 493 (2010). 
42 See Candida L. Saunders, The Truth, The Half-Truth, and Nothing Like the Truth: Reconceptualizing 
False Allegations of Rape, 52 Brit. J. Criminol. 1152 (2012) (exploring judgments of U.K. front-line law 
enforcement professionals as to rape allegations); see also Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, Turning 
Mirrors into Windows? Assessing the Impact of (Mock) Juror Education in Rape Trials, 49 Brit. J. 
Criminol. 363 (2009). 
43 For an extreme version of this larger social influence, see Adriaan Lanni’s exploration of the effect on 
civic norms of trial speeches at Athenian trials.  Law and Order in Ancient Athens (2016). 
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Of course, defendants receive an education as well. As Ben Justice and Tracey Meares 
observe, “for an increasing number of Americans, the criminal justice system plays a 
powerful and pervasive role in providing a formal education in what it means to be a 
citizen.”44  The lessons that prosecutors “teach” can go beyond the specific social norms 
implicated by the charged conduct. What a serious criminal prosecution amounts to, at 
least in the United States, is an effort to detach a defendant from society, not just as a 
physical matter but as a political one.45  These citizenship lessons reach, and affect the 
lives of, not just convicted defendants but those around them.46  
To what extent should a democratic prosecutor self-consciously promote the range of 
epiphenomenal externalities that attend a criminal conviction?  When American 
prosecutors deliberately tease apart what ostensibly looks like a bundled conviction 
outcome – bargaining around immigration consequences for individuals,47 or around the 
collateral consequences of corporate convictions48 – are they circumventing legislative 
intent or sensitively navigating a legislative menu?  Even when prosecutors purport to 
stay within the four corners of their adjudicative assignment, should we encourage 
reflection on larger audience responses or regret it?  My instinct is always on the side of 
self-reflection, but Duff is surely right to worry about maximal self-consciousness at the 
individual level.49 For now, let us simply recognize the social consequences of the 
prosecutorial project, whether appreciated or not. 
                                                
44 Benjamin Justice & Tracey Meares, How the Criminal Justice System Educates Citizens, 651 Annals, 
Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 159, 160 (2014); see also Vesla M. Weaver & Amy Lerman, Political 
Consequences of the Carceral State, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 817 (2010) (providing evidence indicating that 
criminal justice contact has a large, negative effect on voting, involvement in civic groups, and trust of 
government).  
45 Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship and Criminal Law, supra note 14, at 143 (“In penal theory, some argue 
that those who commit crimes lose their standing as citizens, so that we can treat them in ways in which we 
could not treat citizens, and deny them the respect and concern that we owe to citizens; such a view finds 
formal legal expression in the loss of the right to vote (a central aspect of citizenship) suffered during their 
incarceration by those serving prison terms in Britain, and for life by convicted felons in some American 
states.”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions And Doubts: Retribution, Representation, And The 
Debate Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1147(2004); Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis, 
3 Punishment & Society 95, 112 (2001) (noting “convicts are subjected to ever-longer and broader post-
detention forms of social control and symbolic branding that durably set them apart from the rest of the 
population”). 
46 See Traci R. Burch, Effects of Imprisonment and Community Supervision on Neighborhood Political 
Participation in North Carolina, 651 Annals, Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 184, 185 (2014) (“The criminal 
justice system has the power to shape not only the political participation of current and former felons but 
also the participation of the people who live around them because criminal justice interactions are 
demographically and geographically concentrated.”). 
47 See Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 775 (2016). 
48 See Daniel Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 265, 278-79 (2014) [hereinafter 
Richman, Corporate Headhunting] (arguing for experimentation with sanction decoupling). 
49 See RA Duff, this volume. 
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B. Holding More than the Usual Suspects Accountable 
 
The point of departure for the foregoing section had the prosecutor deciding how to 
proceed when the police have presented her with a suspect.  This section considers how 
prosecutors, because of their adjudicative function, are uniquely positioned not simply to 
seek the accountability of those presented to them but to push beyond the frame the 
police have constructed and to promote the accountability of others as well, including the 
police themselves. 
1. Promotion of Police Accountability  
 
The role prosecutors play in promoting citizen accountability may be complemented by 
their influence on the police – the primary point of contact for citizens with the criminal 
justice establishment – as monitors and mediators.  One needs to be careful here, as there 
is tremendous variation across countries – and within them, at least in the United States – 
on this potential contribution to the rule of law and democratic accountability.  Jacqueline 
Hodgson has explored the limited degree to which the French procureur supervises police 
investigations.50  In England and Wales, it remains to be seen whether the Crown 
Prosecution Service (“CPS”) has the institutional capacity to push police forces to build 
stronger cases.51  In the United States, the lack of any hierarchy that would oblige police 
to attend to prosecutorial preferences (or vice versa) frequently leads to institutional 
disjunction, not coordination.52 
Still, prosecutors’ position as gatekeepers of the adjudicative process and their unique 
ability to deploy both technical expertise and experience as repeat players before ultimate 
adjudicators give them leverage to question and perhaps change police behavior (at least 
across those police domains that rely on the credible threat of adjudicative action). These 
sources of authority – whether deployed or not – exist even in the absence of the sort of 
institutional clout that prosecutors might gain from political independence (of the sort 
wielded by elected district attorneys in the United States).  They draw not just on 
prosecutor’s special knowledge and the reputational bonding that arises out of their 
repeat-player status,53 but on their legal training and acculturation.  Intermediation, after 
all, is what lawyers are trained to do – between clients and court or regulators, between 
                                                
50 See Jacqueline S. Hodgson, The French Prosecutor in Question, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1361, 1395-96 
(2010); see also Jacqueline Hodgson, The Police, the Prosecutor and the Juge D’Instruction: Judicial 
Supervision in France, Theory and Practice, 41 Brit. J. Criminol. 342, 350-51 (2001).   
51 See House of Commons Justice Committee, The Crown Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal 
Justice System (Ninth Report of Session 2008-09) at 14-15. 
52 See Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 2055, 2058-60 
(2006) (discussing lack of coordination between police and prosecutors in New Orleans.). 
53 Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra note 22, at 782-83. 
 13 
clients, and across institutional cultures.  As Sklansky has suggested, intermediation lies 
at the heart of the prosecutorial function.54 
Richard Mulgan explains: 
Forcing people to explain what they have done is perhaps the essential component 
of making them accountable.  In this sense, the core of accountability becomes a 
dialogue between accountors and account-holders . . . using a shared language of 
justification.55  
The ability of citizens to directly hold police officers “to account” for their granular 
decision making varies considerably across polities,56 and changes with technologies (as 
has been seen with viral videos in the United States).  Even so, the essential opacity of 
the criminal process substantially limits their ability to do so in even the most open 
democracies.  Prosecutors, however, have a privileged vantage point.  From there, they 
can force police officers to “explain what they have done” – how the arrest was effected, 
the investigation conducted, the witness questioned.  Even as the questions generally 
arise in a case-specific context, the answers (and perhaps the motivation for the 
questions) will often cut across cases.  To be sure, the degree to which prosecutorial 
views – as supplemented by the views of other adjudicatory actors – are internalized by 
police forces may be a function of, among other things, the extent to which there is 
mutual dependence (what I have called “team production”57) and the political clout of 
each side.  But prosecutors’ potential contribution to overall criminal justice 
accountability ought to be recognized and extended, particularly where, as in England 
and Wales, the legal architecture is no impediment.58 
2. Targeting Illegitimate Exercises of Power 
 
Further consideration of the dynamics of interaction between the police and prosecutors 
should push us to think, not just about how prosecutors can promote police accountability 
across all case types, but also about how prosecutors can foster the pursuit of one subset 
of criminal conduct that they are peculiarly capable of addressing – the illegitimate 
exercises of power that disrespect the individual autonomy at the heart of liberal 
democracy. 
                                                
54 See David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 117 J. Crim. L & Crim. 
(forthcoming). 
55 Richard Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies 9 (2003). 
56 See Monica den Boer & Roel Fernhout, Policing the Police: Police Oversight Mechanisms in Europe: 
Toward a Comparative Overview of Ombudsmen and Their Competencies (2008); National Democratic 
Institute, Democratic Oversight of Police Forces: Mechanisms for Accountability and Community Policing 
(2005). 
57 Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra note 22, at 809. 
58 See Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, Joint Inspection of the Provision of Charging Decisions, 25 (May 
2015) (reporting that, outside of the headquarters unit dealing with “the most complex cases,” CPS 
prosecutors were often not giving or being asked for “early investigative advice”). 
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Sklansky has powerfully argued that “‘democratic policing’ should mean . . . making the 
police as effective as possible in combating unjustified patterns of private domination and 
unthreatening as possible as a tool of official domination.”59  For their part, prosecutors 
can help free citizens from the subordination that is antithetical to a liberal democracy 
merely by avoiding illegitimate self-aggrandizement60 and shepherding appropriately 
made criminal cases through the adjudicative process. 
A great deal of regular police work can relieve citizens of illegitimate exercises of power. 
Any city dweller can tell you how the wide berth given to the menacing street tough 
narrows when a cop appears.  Yet, some of the worst exercises of illegitimate power take 
more than a cop’s quick glance to be recognized as such.  These are situations where a 
prosecutor’s slow second look can make a big difference in uncovering and pursuing 
these exercises. 
Consider the difference between extortion and robbery.  In a robbery, “the threat, the 
point at which the threatened act will occur, and the consent all happen around the same 
time.  The robber says ‘your money or your life,’ and the victim, fearing immediate harm, 
hands over his wallet.”61  A police officer encountering this scene will quickly figure out 
what is happening, and if she can’t, the victim will explain.  Extortion is very different.  
Here the bad guy may say “make regular payments to me or I will hurt you and your 
family.”  When the victim pays, the transaction will look pretty ordinary; the police 
officer who encounters it will have no reason to think otherwise, and, in all too many 
cases, the victim won’t explain.62  Indeed, the worse – the more serious and the more 
enduring – the exercise of illegitimate power, the more “natural” the transaction will look 
and the less likely the victim will be to tell the police about it.  Indeed, some “victims,” 
might not even feel victimized, like those who make payoffs to public officials – payoffs 
that are ultimately included in the contract price, which in turn is often paid by the state 
and its taxpayers. 
Then there are instances of private oppression that might occasion a call to the police and 
a response, but that won’t make it through the adjudication process without special 
attention.  This is the world of domestic violence, where, if a case ever makes it to trial, 
the defendant’s chief witness will often be the victim herself, and the prosecution’s case 
will have to be made through evidence collected with an eye to just such an asymmetric 
adjudication.63  Avlana Eisenberg has found similar dynamics at work in hate crime 
                                                
59 Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, supra note 7, at 127. 
60 For a horrendous example of illegitimate prosecutorial domination, see Nancy King’s story of Duncan v. 
Louisiana, in Criminal Procedure Stories (Carol Steiker, ed., 2003). 
61Daniel C. Richman, Kate Stith, & William J. Stuntz, Defining Federal Crimes 270 (2014). 
62 Id.  
63 See Andrew R. Klein, National Institute of Justice, Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence 
Research, 43-44 (June 2009); see also Jill Theresa Messing, Evidence-Based Prosecution of Intimate 
Partner Violence in the Post-Crawford Era: A Single-City Study of the Factors Leading to Prosecution, 60 
Crime & Delinq. 238 (2014). 
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investigations, where, in the absence of prosecutorial prodding, police officers regularly 
avoid considering motive, looking only to physical harm.64  It is also the world of 
organized crime. 
Perhaps every case of domestic violence, gang intimidation, or official corruption does 
not threaten democracy.  But impunity does.  These are the offenses where the harm goes 
well beyond the injury suffered from specific acts, and where the exercise of illegitimate 
power can cripple the ability of victims and those around them to flourish as individuals 
and citizens.  Because what makes these exercises of power particularly insidious is that 
their illegitimacy won’t be conspicuous to outsiders, these are precisely the cases unlikely 
to be successfully developed and pursued without prosecutors taking the lead. 
Let me not overstate the point.  Can one envision that the same kind of dedicated 
detective work that one sees in homicide dramas (pick your country), and sometimes in 
real life, can build domestic violence and hate crime cases and doggedly pursue 
organized crime and corruption cases?  Of course, especially if one considers the wide 
range of institutional arrangements across jurisdictions and assumes the requisite resource 
commitments.  Police departments with hate crime units are more likely to follow 
through on their institutional commitment to bias cases,65 and the same dynamics can be 
expected with domestic violence, and perhaps even organized crime.  Still, the pressures 
on police forces with patrol and crime control responsibilities are indefeasible and all too 
often – particularly when murder has not occurred and victims are not complaining – 
come at the cost of the intensive police work needed to investigate crimes not in plain 
view.66 
These are pressures that prosecutors are well positioned to counter and compensate for.  
There is evidence that they can do just that, if properly supported.  In the United States, 
studies have found that a combination of “no drop” policies and a high degree of 
coordination between police and specialized prosecutors is the key to increasing the 
success of domestic violence prosecutions.67  In England and Wales, in the face of 
“disappointingly mixed reports about the extent to which [U.K. police] forces and the 
CPS are pursuing evidence-led prosecutions” in domestic violence cases, authorities have 
highlighted the gap between articulated prosecutorial needs and police investigative 
efforts.68  In Germany, on the other hand, where an overwhelming proportion of domestic 
                                                
64 Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 858, 885-86 (2014). 
65 Id. at 885; see also Jennifer Balboni & Jack McDevitt, Hate Crime Reporting: Understanding Police 
Officer Perceptions, Departmental Protocol, and the Role of the Victim: Is There Such a Thing as a “Love” 
Crime?, 3 Just. Res. & Pol’y 1 (2001). 
66 For a sense of how the pressures to do street enforcement drain intensive investigation resources, even in 
homicide cases, see Loevy, supra note 25. 
67 Klein, supra note 63, at 45. 
68 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, Everyone’s Business: Improving the Police Response to Domestic 
Abuse, 102–103 (2014).  The interaction between police and prosecutors in domestic violence cases, 
particularly in the face of “attrition” has be the subject of sustained attention by UK authorities. See HM 
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violence cases end up dismissed, a 2004 report faulted the police for not gathering 
adequate evidence and prosecutors for being too prone to abide by victim inclinations to 
drop.69  
In domestic violence cases, prosecutors’ unique competence lies in their ability to 
preserve what might be unstable evidence of criminal conduct, with an eye to the 
demands of an especially challenging adjudicative process.  In cases involving more 
organized criminal conduct, their unique competence lies in their deployment of the 
adjudicative process itself to investigate and prove criminal conduct.  Again, with due 
recognition of my American bias, I make only a provisional claim about how organized 
criminal activity and particularly corruption can most productively be pursued.  The 
claim, though, is that enforcers can go after embedded criminal activity only if they can 
obtain closely held private information from those with their own criminal culpability, 
and that the only effective “currency” is leniency in adjudicative outcomes.  Prosecutors’ 
adjudicative role thus makes them necessary actors in this investigative process – which 
often will proceed in grand juries, the special province of U.S. prosecutors70 – and their 
efforts will determine how high up a criminal hierarchy penal sanctions can go. 
Certainly the use of deal-brokered accomplice testimony has become (for better or worse) 
a hallmark of U.S. organized crime and corruption prosecutions.71  Indeed, my sense is 
that some of the interest in “American style” prosecutions – in Brazil, for example – 
comes from a desire to replicate U.S. tactics in such cases.72  And Shawn Marie Boyne 
reports that even in Germany, where “there is still widespread denial … regarding the use 
of ‘confession agreements’ in major crime cases,” deals are regularly made and are of 
particular use in corruption cases.73  She also notes that, even though most cases in 
Germany start with a police investigation whose matured fruits will only thereafter be 
sent to prosecutors, the very nature of economic crime and corruption cases requires 
considerable prosecutor–police cooperation from the start.74 
                                                                                                                                            
Inspectorates of Crown Prosecution Service and Constabulary, Violence at Home: A Joint Thematic 
Inspection of the Investigation and Prosecution of Cases Involving Domestic Violence (Feb. 2004). 
69 Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth, Working Together to Combat 
Domestic Violence: Cooperation, Intervention, Research, at 17 (2004). 
70 See Daniel Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 339 (1999). 
71 See Daniel Richman, Cooperating Clients 56 Ohio St. L. J. 69 (1995); see also Alexandra Natapoff, 
Snitching: Criminal Informants and the Erosion of American Justice (2011). 
72 See Will Connors & Luciana Magalhaes, How Brazil’s “Nine Horsemen” Cracked a Bribery Scandal, 
Wall St. J. Apr. 6, 2015; see also OECD, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention in Brazil (Oct. 2014), at 40–41. 
73 Shawn Marie Boyne, The German Prosecution Service 138 (2013). 
74 Id. at 129. 
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Mind you, the claim is not that prosecutors are inherently white knights questing to 
relieve subordination in the home or on gang turf and ready to target those who would 
abuse the democratic process for private ends.  Nor is it that criminal law is necessarily 
the best vehicle for furthering these goals.  Rather I merely suggest that if criminal 
sanctions are going to be used, prosecutors will have to play an outsized role in the 
process – certainly larger than the one they play in “regular” episodic criminal cases and 
at least as large as that normally played by the police.  In contrast to street crimes, if 
prosecutors are not spearheading the pursuit of, say, corruption, those cases are unlikely 
to happen.  
3. Prosecutors and Legislative Accountability 
 
The accountability that prosecutors can bring to the police will play out at both the retail 
and wholesale levels: When a prosecutor questions the legality of an arrest or the 
sufficiency of the evidence the police provide to support formal charges, the iterated 
nature of this kind of case can lead to broader policy discussions or disputes.  How about 
other branches of government?  To what extent should prosecutors be able to hold 
legislators’ feet to the fire on criminal justice issues?   
 
In theory, were criminal justice outputs sufficiently valued and closely monitored by the 
elected officials responsible for constructing and funding the operative legal regime, a 
high degree of insulation from politics would not impair the democratic prosecutorial 
mission, and could indeed promote it.  Not only is there always a risk of institutional self-
dealing, but the separation of everyday politics from the administration of criminal justice 
can further rule-of-law values at the heart of democratic liberalism. 
When it comes to institutional self-dealing, the United States provides a dramatic object 
lesson.  Many have noted how the federal Justice Department regularly proposes and 
shapes the legislative products of Congress.75  Federal prosecutors also shape the 
effective scope of legislation through the cases they choose to pursue and the legal 
interpretations they promote through carefully chosen facts.76  Yet more notable than the 
influence of one co-equal political branch on another at the federal level have been the 
sustained and successful efforts of local prosecutors to block and advance criminal justice 
measures in their statehouses.  Michael Campbell, for example, has given a powerful 
account of how, between 1989 and 1993, Texas prosecutors blocked sentencing reform 
and pushed for prison expansion.  He notes:  
                                                
75 See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 
Va. L. Rev. 271 (2013); Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds – The 
Center Doesn’t, 117 Yale L.J. 1374, 1388 (2008) [hereinafter Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007]. 
76 Daniel Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 
UCLA L. Rev. 757, 762–63 (1999); see also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal 
Law?, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 479–80 (1996). 
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Texas prosecutors were influential because they provided an important link 
between state and local politics, and because prosecutors have specialized skills 
linked to their position as legal experts and political actors.  They operated as an 
important interpreter of popular demands, and as a powerful voice in opposing 
legal changes that would limit their discretion.77 
That prosecutors – working within a plea-bargaining regime that allows them to use the 
threat of harsher sentences and expansive liability theories to induce defendants to give 
their trial rights – have endeavored to reduce judicial sentencing discretion is not 
particularly surprising, however regrettable.78  More disheartening, at least from a 
democracy-promoting perspective, has been their opposition to (or simply tepid support 
for) the adequate funding for indigent defense schemes.79  Prosecutorial involvement in 
the larger political process thus can come with real costs to liberal values. 
That said, prosecutorial insulation from the political process when those within it do not 
adequately attend to the health of the criminal justice system comes with a different set of 
costs.  For a sense of these costs, one needs only to look at instances where the insulation 
of prosecutors has left them unable to prevent their work from being undercut, even 
nullified by political actors.  Carlo Rossetti reports that in Italy, when a “tiny group of 
magistrates” brought major corruption cases, those just ended up on the long queue of 
cases awaiting trial, subject to legislated deadlines for disposal of cases that gave the 
targets of long corruption probes “de facto impunity.”80  In England and Wales, the 
CPS’s lack of political clout has come with an underfunding that surely has system-wide 
effects.81  The abuses of lobbying power ought not blind us to the role prosecutors can 
play as engaged and knowledgeable reform leaders. 
III. ACHIEVING DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
                                                
77 Michael C. Campbell, Ornery Alligators and Soap on a Rope: Texas Prosecutors and Punishment Reform 
in the Lone Star State, 16 Theoretical Criminol. 289, 290 (2011); see also Jonathan Simon, Governing 
Through Crime (2007) (arguing that “prosecutorial complex” has been the driving force in criminal justice 
governance). 
78 See R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Support Sentencing 
Reform, 45 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 981 (2014). 
79 For an insightful exploration of the political economy of indigent defense funding in the United States, 
see Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 907 (2010); see also Lawrence C. 
Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73. Ford. L. Rev. 955, 961 (2004) (quoting a Georgia prosecutor “who 
opposed an indigent defense-funding measure on the ground that ‘it was the greatest threat to the proper 
enforcement of the criminal laws of this state ever presented.’”).  For a burden-increasing proposal 
designed to recruit prosecutors to lobby for indigent defense funding, see Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the 
Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 85, 119 (2007).   
80 Carlo Rossetti, The Prosecution of Political Corruption: France, Italy and the USA – A Comparative 
View, 13 Innovation 169, 173 (2000). 
81 See Owen Bowcott, Crown Prosecution Service chief inspector signals concern over funding: Kevin 
McGinty says cuts can leave agencies unable to function, amid fears criminal justice system cannot sustain 
its schedule, The Guardian, Sept. 23, 2015. 
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Having explored some of the ways in which prosecutors can contribute to a well-
functioning democracy, one can easily jump to a number of basic questions: First, to what 
extent do we want prosecutors to play these roles?  Second, are other institutions better 
suited to play each role, and why?  And third, what institutional design trade-offs might 
both serve these goals and ensure prosecutorial accountability?  I can’t image any 
categorical answers to these questions, which all involve foundational political choices 
and require engagement with the entire socio-legal structure in which the criminal justice 
regime, and the prosecutorial establishment in particular, is enmeshed. 
Yet once again shielded by Ricardo’s law, let me go straight to the third question.  And 
on even this, I start with critical caveats that (I hope) excuse the level of abstraction (and, 
again, the American bias) with which I proceed.  Even as I talk generally about 
institutional characteristics, I’ll give scant attention to the precise institutional designs 
that generate them.  This sweep is in part dictated by an interest in trans-jurisdictional 
breadth.  But it is also dictated by a lack of correspondence between de jure and de facto 
features of prosecutorial regimes.  When trying to take “systematic stock” of 
prosecutorial independence transnationally, for example, van Aaken et al. found that the 
correlation between de jure and de facto indicia of prosecutorial independence (i.e. tenure 
and formal accountability to political hierarchs vs. actual forced retirements, and changes 
in legal foundations for the prosecution of crimes) was “slightly negative.”82  Indeed, 
they found a slight correlation between de jure prosecutorial independence and higher 
levels of perceived corruption.83  And they suggest that “this finding reflects reversed 
causality: Due to gentle pressure to fight corruption, many governments have passed 
fresh legislation granting their prosecutors more formal independence.  Yet, formal 
legislation often remains unenforced.”84 
Permit me, then, to provisionally speculate in general terms about the coherence of 
various institutional design features with the various democracy-advancing roles that 
prosecutors might play.  Put differently, let me return to the question of how to promote 
democratic accountability for prosecutors within existing structures.  I’ll first note the 
limitations of specific accountability paradigms and then step beyond them to explore 
cross-cutting institutional design and legal regime considerations.   
A. Accountability Paradigms and Their Limitations 
 
Mulgan has usefully set out several accountability typologies: “legal (external with high 
control), political (external with low control), bureaucratic (internal with high control), 
professional (internal with low control).”85  Each of these, to varying extents and in 
varying combinations, has been extended to prosecutorial establishments.  The United 
States is somewhat of an outlier in its reliance on fragmented authority and direct 
                                                
82 Anne van Aaken, et al., supra note 4 at, 220.   
83 Id. at 223. 
84 Id. at 229. 
85 Mulgan, supra note 55, at 31. 
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political accountability, with most liberal democracies relying on a mix of legal and 
bureaucratic mechanisms.   
Does an embrace of the full measure of contributions that prosecutors can make to 
democracy necessarily imply preference for a particular kind of prosecutorial 
establishment and blend of accountability typologies?  I’m not sure.  Here, the 
“regulatory trilemma” identified by Teubner appears in the tradeoffs required when we 
balance regularity against effectiveness against responsiveness.86  Consider the most 
dramatic project from Part II: the crusading prosecutor committed to curing democracy 
deficits by taking on entrenched interests in government or at its periphery.  The stuff of 
legends, movies,87 and sometimes reality.  Such a figure is unlikely to step out of a 
bureaucracy tightly tethered – by culture, hierarchy, regulation or some combination 
thereof88 – to a central authority anchored in the political status quo.89 One would not 
expect grand corruption to be a central interest of this bureaucracy, and in France (to take 
one example) it hasn’t been.90   
Move to a different project, and the analysis changes radically.  Even when maximally 
pursued, grand corruption cases are but a small part of the prosecutorial diet.  In most 
cases, the project of punishment modulation becomes most salient, and bureaucratic 
regularity has considerable appeal.  Indeed, the very notion of a prosecutor playing a self-
conscious democracy-promoting role may be anathema to those looking for consistency, 
professionalism, and compliance with positive law.   
                                                
86 See supra text accompanying note 13.  
87 My favorite film example is the “examining magistrate” in Costa Gavras’s Z.  See Robert L. Waring, 
Picturing Justice: Images of Law and Lawyers in the Visual Media, Z, 30 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1077 (1995).   
88 Mirjan Damaška noted long ago that the real limits on prosecutorial discretion in Europe have come less 
from the external legal system but internal organizational structures and norms – hierarchical, centralized 
supervision of the prosecutorial corps and a professional emphasis on consistent, uniform decisionmaking. 
See generally Mirjan Damaška, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 Yale L.J. 
480, 503–04 (1975).  
89 See Anne van Aaken, et al., The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion 
within the Executive Branch – A Conceptual Framework, 15 Constitutional Political Economy 261, 262 
(2004) (noting recent scandals involving possible pressure by the executive on prosecutors pursuing 
corruption cases in Germany, Italy and Israel, and arguing that “[a] procuracy depending on the executive 
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Even were we to select only for the crusading project, I’m not sure what the optimal 
prosecutorial arrangement would be.  Rossetti attributes the zeal of the Italian judges and 
prosecutors who pursued corruption in the 1990s to their constitutionally secured 
independence, which “protects them from arbitrary interference by the executive and 
legislative branches.”91  DiFederico, on the other hand, questions the attribution of 
anticorruption zeal to the independence and low democratic accountability of Italian 
prosecutors, noting that prosecutors were similarly insulated during a long period of 
inactivity.92  Indeed when prosecutors are too well insulated, citizen voices against 
impunity – a possible wellspring of zeal and democratic commitment – will also be 
muted.  It was just such voices, from local anti-corruption groups, that prodded local 
prosecutors in Indonesia into action, according to a recent World Bank study.93  (This is 
not to say that those voices were enough.  The study also tells how local Indonesian 
anticorruption movements had trouble sustaining public pressure as cases inched through 
the legal process and how they had scant influence once cases moved up to the 
centralized appeals process.94)  
Fear not, appreciating how public pressure can galvanize prosecutors into action does not 
lead me to support prosecutorial elections, even in service of the crusading project.  After 
all, the politics that drive prosecutorial elections will usually be those in which a corrupt 
elite is enmeshed.  Even the pursuit of sex abuse cases within a specific community can 
fall victim to political expediency.95  Whether or not the prosecutor has any further 
political ambitions (and an important subset do), virtually all will have political 
affiliations that give pause to those looking for magisterial purity.  Even if one assumes 
that the claims of partisan targeting that will inevitably attend prosecutions frequently 
lack foundation, the risk both real and perceived that criminal cases will be treated as an 
extension of partisan warfare is real, and has become a standard American trope.96 
Indeed, I would go further and suggest that, even in the country where prosecutorial 
elections are the norm – to the understandable dismay of most domestic and comparative 
scholars97 – embrace of them as instruments of democratic accountability and non-
bureaucratic zeal has been at best half-hearted.  Many have cogently argued that the 
                                                
91 Rossetti, supra note 80, at 169. 
92 Giuseppe Di Federico, Prosecutorial Independence and the Democratic Requirement of Accountability in 
Italy: Analysis of a Deviant Case in a Comparative Perspective, 38 Br. J. Criminol. 371, 383 (1998). 
93 Taufik Rinaldi, Marini Purnomo & Dewi Damayanti, Fighting Corruption in Decentralized Indonesia 
(World Bank Case Studies on Handling Local Government Corruption), at 8 (May 2007). 
94 Id. at 8, 71. 
95 See Ray Rivera & Sharon Otterman, For Ultra-Orthodox in Abuse Cases, Prosecutor Has Different 
Rules, NY Times, May 10, 2012 (reporting on Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes’s treatment of sex 
abuse cases within a Jewish community). 
96 See Sanford C. Gordon, Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Public Corruption Prosecutions, 103 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 534 (2009). 
97 Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 Crime and Justice 1 (2012).  
 22 
dominant American approach offers the worst of all worlds: Because the elections are 
generally not seriously contested, they offer little in the way of accountability, yet the 
populism they inject into the process still impedes the thoughtful exercise of prosecutorial 
authority.98  But it bears remembering that the idea behind the move to popular elections 
– widespread in the second quarter of the nineteenth century – was more defensive than 
offensive: to deflect efforts of governors and legislators to use appointment system for 
political patronage.99  Such defensiveness is somewhat of a theme across American 
prosecutorial establishments.  In the federal system, for instance, the relative 
independence of appointed U.S. attorneys from the political hierarchs in Washington has 
been (regularly, but not always) fostered by Congress less in the interest of controlling 
the districts themselves than to prevent the President and his circle from exercising such 
control.100  Note how this theme accepts and perhaps even reinforces a regime in which 
prosecutorial discretion is at its apogee: Rather than rein in prosecutors – through 
legislative specificity, closer judicial supervision, or binding executive guidelines – the 
institutional design project has been more to prevent the political deployment of the 
office by other hubs of governmental power.  And even that project has been hostage to 
contingency and history, as we discovered when President George W. Bush tried to cull 
his United States attorneys.101  
It is hardly a defense of the American embrace of direct political accountability to 
observe that it furthers negative goals that are different from those ostensibly targeted.  
But in the end, my expository goal is also negative.  I have simply taken a handful of 
many possible democracy-promoting projects for prosecutors and suggested why it may 
be difficult, even with that limited focus, to figure out the optimal institutional 
arrangements to promote them.  I’ve considered only the choice between a politically 
insulated bureaucracy and elected political hierarchs.  Just think how hard the equation 
gets if we also consider different doctrinal approaches to prosecutorial decision making – 
“principle of legality” vs. the “principle of opportunity” – or different modes of fact-
finding, adversarial vs. inquisitorial.  One would then have to account for path-dependent 
and historically contingent traditions that foster institutional cultures.  And then, if the 
goal is really to have a tournament of systems, one would have to look at the entire array 
of ways that prosecutors might promote democracy, opine on the efficacy with which 
each system promotes each goal, and devise some global means of balancing.  Perhaps 
someone can actually do this.  I lack the data, competence, and inclination. 
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So where does this leave us?  Even as various states reassess aspects of their legal 
regimes and institutional structure, path dependency limits formal change – particularly 
in an area where informal adaptation is usually more convenient to insiders.  If we are to 
be attentive to ways in which liberal democracies can support prosecutors, as well as vice 
versa, better that we speak of the principles that ought to guide change or stability across 
diverse institutional arrangements, rather than celebrate or condemn particular regimes.   
B. Principles Cutting Across Accountability Typologies 
 
When assessing the normative promise of institutional arrangements, we should heed 
Andreas Schedler’s reminder:  
Holding power accountable does not imply determining the way it is exercised; 
neither does it aim at eliminating discretion through stringent bureaucratic 
regulation.  It is a more modest project that admits that politics is a human 
enterprise whose elements of agency, freedom, indeterminacy, and uncertainty are 
ineradicable; that power cannot be subject to full control in the strict, technical 
sense of the word.102  
Mindful of this counsel, I will offer a few modest principles with application across 
diverse prosecutorial regimes.  Obviously incomplete, the list is, at best, a good first step. 
1. Language of Rationality and Equality 
 
At a bare minimum, those exercising power need to be able to explain themselves – give 
an “account” – to someone, somehow.  There are also normative constraints on what 
those explanations can be – one being that the language sound in rationality and equality.  
Any prosecutorial establishment must, as Jerry Mashaw has put it, give “operational 
content” to the “public reason approach” that provides legitimacy to those “modern states 
characterised by both democratic aspirations and a heavily administrative institutional 
structure.”103  And the public reasons offered need to themselves be true to democratic 
values. 
If, like Edward Rubin, one defines accountability “as the ability of one actor to demand 
an explanation or justification of another actor for its actions, and to reward or punish the 
second actor on the basis of its performance or explanation,”104 we can easily see how a 
highly bureaucratic system, with line actors acting at the direction of and under the 
hierarchal control of supervisors who themselves are similarly accountable, can limit the 
reasons a line prosecutor may give and formally preclude the exercise of “discretion.”105 
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Yet the challenges of ex ante specification are endemic (though perhaps not unique) to 
penal systems and particularly great when the “principle of legality” requires the pursuit 
of every makeable case. 
Canonical and bureaucratic restriction of the language of prosecutorial justification may 
thus drive the action underground, with mixed normative results.  Consider Germany.  As 
Shawn Boyne explains:  
[A] significant part of a German prosecutor’s initial training involves one-on-one 
training in the art of documenting actions taken on a case file.  Not only does this 
one-on-one training ensure that prosecutors accurately and consistently document 
the history of a case in the case file, the training systematically conveys the 
routines of organizational practice to newcomers entering the organization. . . .  In 
theory, any prosecutor could pick up another prosecutor’s file and immediately 
understand the case.106 
Such documentation may come with risks of, indeed an invitation to, disingenuity.  In a 
plea for more candor about prosecutorial discretion in Germany and elsewhere, Erik Luna 
has noted that “some European systems have … preserved orthodox interpretations of the 
legality principle only by denying the existence of prosecutorial power.”107  This quiet 
opacity has upsides: Luna suggests that “mandatory prosecution” (a principle that 
Germany has relaxed only for low-level or juvenile cases108) – might be seen as a 
“necessary fiction” that “maintain[s] prosecutorial independence from the political 
process and [] protect[s] prosecutors from charges of arbitrary decisionmaking.”109  Yet 
Thomas Weigend properly notes how the move ends up shielding the prosecutor from 
personal responsibility,110 with a consequent loss of even conversational accountability.   
In such circumstances, perhaps bureaucratic accountability mechanisms can profitably be 
supplemented with political ones.  In recognition of the democracy deficit endemic to 
bureaucratic hierarchies, the Venice Commission has noted the increasing use of 
“prosecuting councils” across Europe.  It observes: “If they are composed in a balanced 
way, e.g. by prosecutors, lawyers and civil society, and when they are independent from 
other state bodies, such councils have the advantage of being able to provide valuable 
expert input in the appointment and disciplinary process and thus to shield them at least 
                                                
106 Shawn Boyne, Procedural Economy in Pre-Trial Procedure, Developments in Germany and the United 
States, 24 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 329, 353 (2015). 
107 Erik Luna, Prosecutor King, 1 Stan. J. L. & Crim. Policy 48, 81 (2014).  
108 Boyne, supra note 106, at 339. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (citing Thomas Weigend, A Judge by Another Name? Comparative Perspectives on the Role of the 
Public Prosecutor, in The Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective, 391 (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, eds., 
2012)). 
 25 
to some extent from political influence.  Depending on their method of appointment, they 
can provide democratic legitimacy for the prosecution system.”111  
If the characteristic fault of German prosecutors is to deny that there is any discretion to 
explain, that of American prosecutors – and it is probably more grievous – is to offer 
scant explanation for starkly discretionary decisions.  Here, what can often be a 
substantial absence of bureaucratic accountability – particularly in county-based state 
systems, but to varying extents everywhere – is justified (such as it is) by reference to a 
political accountability far more direct than a “prosecuting council.” 
To some extent, the direct (or in the federal system, indirect) electoral accountability of 
U.S. prosecutors can lead to public reasoning about priorities and policies.  But public 
discourse in the United States about prosecutorial choices is limited, not just because of 
the opacity of the plea bargaining process but – even for those cases that go to trial – 
because of evidentiary rules that preclude the presentation of a great deal of information 
considered in the decision to charge, as well as legislation lacking much specificity, and a 
doctrinal framework that frees prosecutors from ever explaining why charges were not 
brought.112  Moreover, as anyone familiar with the “politics of crime” in the United States 
knows,113 wildly swinging electoral politics will often undercut the ability of prosecutors 
to promote reasoned local conversations (even when they are interested in doing so).114 
Americans could, of course, ask more of prosecutors in the courtroom.  Indeed, cogent 
arguments have long been made for empowering judges – as either a statutory or 
constitutional matter – to demand justifications for charging and plea bargaining 
decisions.115  Formal authority in this regard might simply complement the soft power 
that trial judges frequently deploy – to various extents in various jurisdictions: the ability 
to sternly peer from the bench, say that the prosecutor “must be joking,” and ensure that 
the prosecutor who “doesn’t get with the program” regrets it.  Yet the general reluctance 
of appellate courts and legislators to give judges de jure authority is not just a matter of 
separation of power formalism but deep-seated (however contestable) concerns about 
institutional competence. 
Would the accountability of American prosecutors be usefully enhanced if they no longer 
had  absolute immunity to constitutional tort suits for conduct relating to their 
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adjudicatory decisionmaking?116  I suspect not, since only the most egregious and 
provably illegal conduct provides the basis for relief in suits when immunity is 
“qualified” – as it is for the police or for prosecutors acting in an investigative 
capacity.117  I would also want a better sense of what the noise-to-signal ratio would be, 
were this litigation avenue opened up.  That said, egregious prosecutorial conduct has 
occurred with sad regularity.  At the very least, placing prosecutors on equal footing with 
the police and dispensing with the need to distinguish between advocacy and 
investigative work by prosecutors would eliminate the distortions in constitutional tort 
law created when the interconnectiveness of prosecutorial and police activity is ignored 
and when those seeking relief for wrongful convictions have to focus on police 
conduct.118  Since wrongful conviction cases can spark reform outside the courts even 
when unsuccessful within them, it is particularly important to get the whole story across 
all relevant institutions. 
That electoral accountability may contribute little to public reasoning and courts may lack 
much formal power to demand rationales does not mean that American prosecutors are 
not subject to other, more sustained and granular, pressures to explain their actions.  As a 
descriptive matter, there are a variety of other accountability mechanisms that demand 
attention and that, as a normative matter, might be strengthened – mechanisms not unique 
to American prosecutors but, in absence of the top-down bureaucratic dialogue seen 
elsewhere, are of particular importance in the United States.    
My claim is not that the mesh of networked institutions in which prosecutors in the 
United States (and perhaps elsewhere) do their work necessarily provides low-visibility 
channels for reasoned justification and democratic legitimacy, but that it can. Just as 
prosecutors can monitor the police, so too can the police monitor prosecutors and ask 
them to explain their adjudicatory positions.119  To the extent that the police are, by 
structure or task, bound to the citizenry they serve, we should expect some of their 
accountability to carry over to prosecutors who depend on police work.  Indeed, the lack 
of a hierarchical relationship between police and prosecutors, combined with their 
distinct professional cultures, might provoke more reasoned deliberation than otherwise.  
Sure, beat cops usually don’t second-guess charging decisions, even when made by 
rookie (or overly jaded) prosecutors.  But the iterated nature of their interaction, and their 
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distinct chains of command, brings the possibility of a dialogue that may even enrich 
public debate.120   
Iterated interaction between police and prosecutors is not unique to liberal democracies.  
The same creative tensions presumably arise in authoritarian states, without necessarily 
contributing to democratic accountability.  What distinguishes the interactions in a liberal 
democracy is the nature of the institutions involved, with the possibility that police and 
prosecutors there have diverse political anchors that bring a dialogic richness (perhaps 
with expletives) to their conversations.  What also distinguishes them is that, in an open 
society and a media interested in crime news,121 these arguments easily spill into public 
discourse.  Similar provocation for public reasoning may – for some offenses – come 
from victims, should they get an adequate forum – whether formally in court (as in some 
continental systems) or less formally, in communities and the media.   
Then there are defense lawyers: Even in the absence of strong adjudicative controls over 
prosecutorial decisions, one might also imagine that, in an adversary system, defense 
counsel might still do yeoman service in pushing prosecutors to explain, if not justify, 
their discretionary decisions.  Indeed, Jerry Lynch has provocatively imagined a world in 
which plea dispositions emerge out of textured discussions that reflect a “common law” 
across cases.122 
The last two paragraphs were pretty tentative, however, as was Lynch’s insightful piece.  
Foundational to the accountability narratives just adumbrated are vigorous institutional 
players and what Mulgan called a “shared language of justification.”123  This means there 
must be thoughtful collaboration between police and prosecutors, fora where victims and 
affected community can listen and speak, and well-resourced defenders.  If American 
prosecutors are to have a claim to democratic legitimacy through this networked 
accountability, these mechanisms need strengthening.  The German prosecutor bound by 
the principle of legality will justifiably be hard pressed to explain her exercise of 
discretion.  The American prosecutor with sweeping discretion both as a matter of law 
and practice lacks this excuse.  Yet all too often, she deploys lame mantras of 
“prosecuting to the full extent of the law.”124 
Note how a key aspect of the American accountability narrative – and this is a common 
thread in all adversarial systems – requires prosecutors to exert their political power to 
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support defense institutions, especially for the indigent, who comprise a majority of 
criminal defendants.  The same independence that insulates prosecutors from other 
executive and legislative actors thus finds a modicum of justification when deployed to 
support a countervailing source of accountability, for the legitimacy of prosecutorial 
power in part demands that they be able to explain themselves to their adversaries.  
Moreover, the sense of a joint project cutting across legal roles promotes a professional 
accountability that cuts across cases.  As Mulgan notes, professional accountability, while 
potentially flowing from formal disciplinary mechanisms, can also arise from the way 
members of a profession are “answerable to each other through shared networks and 
collegial relationships.”125 
This answerability across institutional divides is quite different from transparency.  
Transparency, of course, is a critical democratic norm, and calls for “the broad visibility 
of government decision making” have been a powerful and understandable part of recent 
criminal justice critiques.126  Still, formal transparency is not an unalloyed good, 
particularly if it provides levers for less engaged, and perhaps overly punitive, actors to 
intervene in downstream decisionmaking.  Such is the lesson of federal sentencing 
history between 1989 and 2007.127  Such has also often been the experience in the United 
States when, to promote consistency within a jurisdiction or an office, bureaucratic 
promulgations have limited line prosecutor options.  While transparent governance does 
not have an inherent punitive tendency, when coupled with punitive politics it has 
ratcheting effects.  When looking across systems, we would thus do well to think more 
about promoting a “shared language of justification” for use across a variety of 
institutional interactions, even those the public cannot and should not know about.   
2. Scale of Accountability    
 
Although often lost in discussions of democratic accountability, any inquiry into the 
relationship of prosecutors to democracy needs to consider scale.  How big need the 
polity in whose name the prosecutor acts be?  And need that polity be the same one that 
produces the criminal laws being enforced?  
Duff gracefully explains how one “distinctive and proper purpose” of “our criminal law” 
is to “call someone to account,” a process that requires a “normative community to which 
both called and callers can be said to belong.”128  But why can’t the community in whose 
name a defendant is called and the prosecutor is doing the calling be unrepresentative, 
even peculiar, elements of the larger polity whence come the laws themselves?  Niki 
Lacey and David Soskice have cogently argued that local autonomy has been a key driver 
                                                
125 Mulgan, supra note 55, at 34; see also Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design, supra note 13, 
at 124-26 (discussing “social accountability”); Richman, Old Chief, supra note 112 (discussing professional 
basis for prosecutorial accountability). 
126 See Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, supra note 7, at 91; Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 Iowa 
L. Rev. 1107 (2000). 
127 Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007, supra note 75. 
128 Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship and Criminal Law, supra note 14, at 126. 
 29 
of over-punitiveness in the United States.129   Still, the division of law-making vs. law-
applying authority embodied in the county-based system offers, what, in theory at least, 
could be a productive blending of small vs. larger community norms.  Moreover, one 
might imagine that, however selected, a local prosecutor – anchored by the local nature of 
so much criminal enforcement – will provide just this blending.  Perhaps at some point 
local variation is an affront to the norm of equal citizenship.  Yet one can also embrace 
the inevitable variation of a loosely linked “federal” system and make that variation itself 
a feature of the membership that a citizen enjoys. 
Even in far more centralized and bureaucratized France, Jacqueline Hodgson and Andrew 
Roberts tell us: 
[I]t is recognised that the prosecutor’s discretion is an important part of adapting 
prosecution policy to local conditions and concerns – an example of the influence 
that certain social and systemic pressures in the broad surround can have on 
subjective decision-making.  The aim may be to manage the flow of cases, 
charging some offences at a lower level so that they remain in a mid-level court 
and are not subjected to the lengthy instruction procedure. . . . Or the aim may be 
to respond to local mores and expectations.130   
Yet considerations of scale – which may depend on a polity’s embrace of local 
“responsiveness” and tolerance for national disparities – must be balanced against 
“capacity.”  With respect to norm generation, this will always be a contestable measure.  
One person’s “community” is bound to be another’s “unrepresentative pocket.” 
Moreover, there will be more objective, or at least exogenous, aspects to capacity that 
implicate the permissible scale for the administration of justice in a liberal democratic 
polity.  Recent reports from Ferguson, Missouri,131 and elsewhere drive the lesson home: 
If a political unit is not big enough to supply adequately trained police and prosecutors or 
support a court system not constrained to self-finance, it needs to be right-sized (to draw 
on a current managerial trope).   
The institutional design “solution” may lie in overlapping jurisdictions, with more 
ostensibly responsive local establishments balanced by national or subnational (but supra-
local) prosecutors whose deficiencies with respect to local knowledge and communal 
preferences find compensation in a perspective less tethered to local leaders and 
pathologies.  Even as I am reluctant to valorize the American federal system – whose 
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floating federal “responsibilities”132 bring their own accountability challenges – the gains 
when one prosecutorial level is able to hold another’s feet to the fire are undeniable.  This 
may play out in policy decisions – as when one prosecutor publically questions the 
priorities and decisions of another – or corruption cases against prosecutors themselves 
and their allies. 
Note that the value of a second level of prosecutors is not just a matter of perspective but 
institutional capacity.  If prosecutors are to make a sustained contribution to democracy – 
one that goes beyond shepherding cases through the adjudicative process – they need the 
capability to either investigate or cause the investigation of the crimes that don’t involve 
manifest disorder of the sort that attracts police attention.  I hesitate to specify the 
institutional arrangements that would best foster prosecutorial attention to domestic 
violence, corruption, and other such cases that strike at the heart of individual autonomy 
and political functionality.  One can imagine, in theory, a wide range of possibilities – 
including overlapping jurisdictions (Robert Cover spoke of the “complex concurrency” of 
the American system133), dedicated police-prosecutor squads, and the like.  Indeed, even 
though a prosecutorial office is freer to invest investigative and adjudicative resources in 
this critical subset of cases when it is not constrained by the principle of legality, some 
combination of political will and institutional accounting can perhaps obtain the same 
result where that principle is respected.  Theory, though, has its limits, and if care is not 
taken, these cases can easily get slighted.   
3. Information Use/Collateral Consequences 
 
Another principle requiring translation across different prosecutorial orders goes not to 
which cases will be brought but how all adjudicated cases will be received.  What volume 
control will there be on prosecutorial articulations of criminality?  Perhaps there should 
be an “acoustical separation” that, by dampening how prosecutors can construct 
citizenship, might compensate for deficiencies in their accountability?134  This 
dampening could limit the social and political meaning of a decision to prosecute that 
ends in a criminal conviction.   
Some aspects of this meaning are endogenous to a polity’s criminal process – the 
definition of an offense, the mode of proof, and the nature and severity of the sentence.  
Affecting all will be the legitimacy of the state generally and of its authority to punish 
specifically.135  Important aspects of a conviction’s meaning, however, are exogenous to 
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the adjudicative process and are subject to regulatory decisions (or non-decisions) that 
can substantially limit a prosecutor’s power to shape the social order.  A well-functioning 
democratic order would attend to these regulatory decisions, which optimally would 
reflect a polity’s considered judgment both about authority already delegated to 
prosecutors and the degree to which it should be extended to other domains. 
Americans have been coming to grips with the authority – by default or otherwise – that 
has been effectively given to prosecutors by laws and rules that make criminal 
convictions into automatic triggers for a slew of “collateral” consequences.  Frequently, 
convicted felons will lose the ability to vote, even after they are released from prison.  In 
Europe and elsewhere, debate rages about whether those incarcerated should lose the 
right while serving their sentence.  An accountability lens offers no clearer resolution of 
these issues than it does on the qualitatively different issue of sentence severity.  
Powerful arguments that it is a grievous category mistake to deprive convicted offenders 
of basic citizenship rights may, for some, find answer in a communitarian logic.136  Yet 
an accountability lens highlights the fact that the United States, where prosecutors are the 
least susceptible to granular accountability for their charging decisions, is also the least 
attentive to the weight that other authorities give those prosecutorial interventions post-
conviction.   
There is no grand paradox here.  The fragmentation of governmental authority in the 
United States and the status accorded prosecutors goes far to explain the cascading (and 
often personally devastating) consequences that attend an adjudicated decision to charge, 
with legislators and regulators quick to pile on.  Indeed, a political status perspective may 
explain the degree to which the United States (as a fragmented collective) allows the 
articulations of its prosecutors to shape the rest of a defendant’s life.  That, combined 
perhaps with different views about the “ownership” of information about public 
(including criminal) processes, may explain the very different approaches to criminal 
records information in the United States and Europe.  As James Jacobs has 
comprehensively shown, while “American criminal records are exceptionally public, 
exceptionally punitive, and exceptionally permanent,”137 the European Union and its 
member states, by contrast,  
treat individual criminal history information as personal data that the individual 
has a right not to have disclosed by government personnel or by private parties. 
Consequently, police records do not circulate at all, court records are not open for 
                                                
136 See John Finnis, Prisoners’ Voting and Judges’ Powers, 13 (2015) (unpublished draft) (“Allowing 
serious criminals to vote during incarceration under sentence says to the law-abiding that their vote does 
not count very much, and says to the criminal that his own vivid defiance of the communal project of self-
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public examination and (except in Sweden) private firms are not permitted to sell 
criminal record information to employers, even if they could obtain it.”138 
Still, the diversity in criminal information regimes – and in the varying degrees to which 
prosecutors are allowed to construct citizenships – usefully pushes us to think harder 
about the relationship between prosecutors’ accountability and their authoritative 
narrative power. 
IV. CONCLUSION   
 
The role of prosecutors in a liberal democracy entails standing apart from the polity, 
speaking for and to it, and being true to its laws and values.  One might see this as an 
existential dilemma, but I prefer to take it as a law and institutional design challenge – a 
challenge that probably does not have a single optimal solution (or at least one 
constitutionally attainable across all jurisdictions).  Above all, it is a challenge to reason: 
to hold people and institutions to account, and to be able to give an account of oneself.   
Prosecutors in the United States have been rightfully pressed in recent years to give a 
better account of themselves.  But so too have prosecutors in other countries.  Before 
resorting to transplantation or even just intellectual valorization, more thought should be 
given to the trade-offs inherent in each set of institutions.  The quiet claim here is not that 
any particular prosecutorial establishment necessarily must trade off one democratic 
citizenship enhancing project for another.  That a prosecutor has a sustained commitment 
to going after corruption and domestic violence should not insulate her from challenges 
that, for example, she is doing a poor job at modulating punitive outcomes.  Still, unless 
we think beyond basic typologies, variations in institutional design will determine the 
likelihood that different projects will be pursued and with what effectiveness.  As 
jurisdictions contemplate reform, they should therefore consider not just what is missing, 
but what they might lose. 
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